Technological Regimes and the Growth of Networks An Empirical Analysis by Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni
Manuscript SBEJ1242-SI




 and Massimo Riccaboni
“
* EPRIS, University of Siena, Italy, pammolli@unisi.it
“ CSC and EPRIS, University of Siena, Italy, mriccaboni@unisi.it
                                                
* Mail Address: DSAS, Faculty of Economics Richard M. Goodwin, University of
Siena, Piazza San Francesco, 7, 53100 Siena, Italy.1
This research was supported by a grant from the Merck Foundation ( EPRIS Project).
Gianluca Panati and three anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged for their
comments to a previous draft of the paper.2
Abstract
This paper shows how specific technological and relational regimes have shaped the
growth of the network of R&D collaborative agreements in pharmaceuticals in the
1990s. Our analysis reveals the existence of a complex set of regimes of firm growth
within the network, providing additional evidence supporting prediction that both
growth and innovative activities of large and small firms respond, even within a given
industry, to considerably different technological and economic factors. Moreover, the
paper shows, in the context of a specific industry and by means of a series of
preliminary and explorative empirical analyses, that information on the topological
properties of a given industrial settings and on roles/positions of organizations within
it can be used to disentangle some fundamental generative processes underlying
observed processes of growth. This result contributes to the ‘old’ stochastic approach
to firm growth, in the direction of building parsimonious and, at the same time, more
realistic, representations of processes of industrial growth.3
1 Introduction
Division of innovative labor through networks of contractual exchanges between
small firms specialized in the upstream stages of the innovation process (Originators)
and large firms focused on the downstream stages of development (Developers) is
recognized as an ever-widening organization form, particularly in high technology,
knowledge-intensive fields (Arrow, 1983; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001).
However, at present, we know little on how these networks of contractual
relationships grow, and how their structural evolution is shaped by specific patterns
of local interaction and underlying technological conditions.
On the one side, despite recent advances, most formal models of the growth of
interfirm networks are largely incomplete when compared to real industrial systems.
On the other side, the literature in applied industrial economics does not provide, at
present, any insight as to whether the properties of real-world networks vary across
industries, and, if so, to which factors such differences could be attributed. The
absence of any such studies appears to be somehow striking, since numerous
contributions have shown that industry-specific characteristics play a fundamental
role in explaining the structural evolution of specific industries, as well as
technological, economic, and growth regimes within them (Dosi, 1982).
Against this background, we analyze the growth of an industry network composed by
a set of small firms acting as Originators of new technological opportunities (new
R&D projects) and a set of large firms acting as Developers.
Specifically, we use graph theoretical tools and measures to unravel how the nature
and evolution of relevant technological conditions have induced distinguishable
patterns of growth in the pharmaceutical innovation system during the Nineties (see
also Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2001). We represent the network and the
division of labor within it by means of a  di-graph (directed graph), in which
organizations are associated to nodes and the relationships among them are associated
to connections.
Sectoral specificity notwithstanding, we aim at characterizing some general and
distinctive properties of the relationships between heterogeneous regimes of firm4
growth and the evolution of industry structures. In particular, it is our claim that the
topological methods of graph theory deal appropriately with the evolving nature of
industrial networks: a) First, they encode all relevant information on the  global
structure of the network; b) Second, a graphical analysis of the system at different
points in time ( comparative statics) can enlighten the transition from a global
relational regime to a different one. In addition, it provides information on the
existence of different roles and types of organizations within the network,
contributing to the identification of the generative processes underlying its structural
transformation and growth. Qualitative changes in the structure of the network are
represented by  topologically non equivalent graphs, while different classes of
organizations can be identified in function of their structural positions and,
subsequently, accordingly to their role in the growth of the system (see Simon, 1962;
Ijiry, Simon, 1977); c) Third, a graph-theoretical approach extracts relevant
information on the evolution of the system, disregarding details. As a consequence, it
can be both  conceptually simpler and  computationally cheaper than any method
based on differential equations in finite-dimensional spaces.
In synthesis, we suggest that the graphical toolkit we introduce can capture the
essence of industrial transformation when industrial systems are far from stable and
unambiguous equilibrium forms. We expect that such an apparatus, if further
developed and refined, can deserve insightful applications in other domains relevant
for the analysis of processes of industry and firm growth, whenever structural
breakthroughs, regime shifts, and technological change are important issues.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze the nature of two major
technological regimes that have shaped the formation and growth of an extensive
system of division of innovative labor in pharmaceuticals. Then, we provide a
description of the growth of the network in the 1990s, based on an inspection of an
extensive data set, which covers around 1,300 organizations and more than 3,800
contractual agreements. In section 3, we perform a set of inspections of the
topological properties of the network at different points in time, coming to identify
two classes of organizations in function of their relational and growth behavior.
Moreover, we show the existence of a striking correspondence between the two
relational regimes identified by our algorithms and the two technological regimes
characterized in section 2. Then, we map the technological and relational regimes5
characterized above onto the relative frequencies of local processes and mechanisms
of growth that shape the size distribution and the global topological properties of the
network. The final section sums up the main findings and implications of our work.
2 Technological Regimes and Division of Innovative Labor in Pharmaceutical
Innovation
2.1.  Technological Regimes in the Recent Evolution of Pharmaceutical R&D
The last thirty years have witnessed a revolution in biological sciences, with
significant basic advances in molecular biology, cell biology, biochemistry, protein
and peptide chemistry, physiology, pharmacology, and other relevant scientific
disciplines.
These new bodies of knowledge have generated a plethora of scientific and
technological opportunities, with an enormous impact on the nature of pharmaceutical
innovation and on patterns of industry evolution. They have nurtured a continuous
flow of entry of new firms, as well as an extensive division of innovative labor
between firms that act mainly as Originators of R&D projects that are then licensed
to firms that act as Developers.
In synthesis, the emergence of a dense set of collaborative relationships among firms
and other research institutions has been a major feature of the recent evolution of the
industry (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
In a previous paper, we have shown that the recent evolution of research strategies
and technologies in pharmaceutical R&D can be characterized by referring to two
main technological regimes, which coexist and complement each other (see Orsenigo,
Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2001).
The first regime, which has started in the mid Seventies, is based on the advances in
molecular biology. According to the so-called molecularization of physiology,
pathology, and pharmacology, the development of new drugs rests on the ability to
generate more fundamental biological theories, towards deeper explanations (i.e.
molecular and infra-molecular levels) of pathological processes that take place at
higher levels of organization inside the human organism. Following this approach,
new technological opportunities have been generated in the form of new therapeutic6
targets and research techniques, along a  hierarchy of increasingly specific sub-
hypotheses. The first regime relies upon research techniques which tend to be
originated by new entrants and stay co-specialized with specific research hypotheses
and fields of application. The hierarchization and co-specialization of the first regime
have dominated the evolution of industry structure in pharmaceutical R&D until the
beginning of the Nineties, promoting a division of labor among organizations and
research labs, which is hierarchical in nature. In this context, older firms, particularly
Developers, capture new technological opportunities and increase their connectivity
more than proportionally than younger ones, benefiting from a significant first mover
advantage. Therefore, in the analyses that follow we refer to the first regime as the
cumulative regime.
The second regime has started to coexist with the cumulative one beginning from the
beginning of the Nineties. It consists of generic research tools and techniques for the
classification, generation, sampling, and screening of thousands upon thousands of
genetic and molecular structures. General-purpose technologies (GPTs) such as bio-
informatics, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), large-scale screening techniques,
combinatorial chemistry, and (post-)genomics achieve a high breadth of applications
and map onto multiple biological targets and diseases. At the level of the industry, the
general purposiveness of the second regime has induced a division of labor across
different fields of application. As compared to the cumulative one, the regime based
on GPTs does not sustain any first mover advantage for  Developers, since
Originators specialized in GPTs tend to establish new links irrespectively of their
partners’ connectivity. Thereby, we refer to the second regime as the random regime.
In other words, the features of the cumulative and random technological regimes lead
to different patterns of local interaction, as well as to different topological structures
of the network. In synthesis (see Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni for a detailed
analysis): i) Originators enter the industry by introducing successive waves of new
research technologies and hypotheses, which shape the growth of the network; ii)
Firms already active within the network do not play a major role as Originators in the
new technological trajectories that emerge after their entry; iii) Earlier entrants gain
access to the new technological trajectories mainly capturing the new opportunities
acting as Developers of projects started by younger firms; iv) As times goes by, the
rate of entry of specialized technology Originators in any given technological7
trajectory tends to slow down as far as Developers succeed in developing internal
capabilities in the new fields. Correspondingly, relational intensity, as well as of
entry, shift forward to new technologies and firms; v) Since the beginning of the
Nineties, the emergence of new General Purpose Research Technologies has affected
the structure of the network, with entrants based on new general purpose technologies
acting as Originators of projects that are licensed to different types of Developers,
irrespectively of age.
Based on this background knowledge, in this paper we focus on the growth of the
network during the Nineties and, in particular, we establish an explicit connection
between the existence of organizations playing different relational roles and the
generative processes that drive the growth of the network over time.
2.2.  Data and Notation
The dataset used throughout this study was compiled from Windhover's databases
1.
Windhover is a well-known source of information on deal-making, financing, and
merger and acquisition activities
2 in pharmaceuticals. As a whole, Windhover
monitors 1583 organizations and 5353 collaborative agreements. In this paper – given
our focus on division of innovative labor – we have selected 3807 R&D collaborative
transactions. As a result, our sample includes 349 pharmaceutical companies, 808
biotechnology firms, and 292 non-industrial research institutes. For each of
organization, we have collected additional information on location, size, main areas
of activity, age, and type.
For each R&D contract, we have recorded the following  transaction-specific
attributes:
Date of signing (from January 1991 to December 2000);
                                                
1 See  www.windhoverinfo.com for further details about Windhover’s databases and information
services.
2 Windhover monitors 989 Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) that took place over the decade. For the
445 firms that stay as legal distinct entities after M&A, our data base continues to keep trace of their
external relational activities. In many cases pharmaceutical companies acquired biotech firms not to
incorporate their expertise  but to add mass to the total R&D effort. As an example, after Roche
acquired Genentech, the latter stayed separate geographically, financially and managerially, and Roche
executives “hardly visited it”.8
Deal value (the preliminary deal value is available for 1229 transactions)
3;
Stage of development at signing (i.e. discovery, preclinical, clinical);
Technological content (i.e. gene therapy, genomics, molecular diversity…);
Targeted disease (i.e. AIDS, Alzheimer, Cancer…);
Typology (viz. license, joint venture, co-development…).
For 3171 contracts (83.3%) we were able to distinguish an Originator (Licensor) of a
specific R&D project from one or more Developers (Licensees). The remaining 636
R&D agreements have been classified as mutual (two-ways) relationships.
In our empirical analysis, we establish an association between research
opportunities/techniques and R&D projects. Every organization is defined by the
collection of its research projects over time, while contractual agreements are
conceived as organizational devices through which opportunities and development
capabilities meet.
The set of relationships is analyzed throughout this work as a  directed graph.
Formally, the structure of the network is represented by  ) , ( V E N , where V is the set
of vertices (organizations), and every edge e (deal) within the graph (industry) is an
oriented link defined by a couple Originator/Developer (o, d)
4. The directed graph
N can be represented by an adjacency matrix  [ ] do a N A N = ￿ ) ( . Matrix entry  do a
equals 1 if an edge  ) , ( o d e does exist, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we label each
connection with the date of signing, and the overall graph  ) , ( V E N  is decomposed in
time specific subgraphs  ) , ( V E Nt , which include only the agreements signed in
period t.
In the rest of this section, Originators are distinguished from Developers, while the
graph is decomposed according to multiple criteria (deal value, date of signing,
technological content), in order to highlight some of the key determinants of its
structural evolution.
                                                
3 Preliminary value equals the sum of all pre-commercialization payments including equity, up-front
licensing, R&D and milestone payments.
4 We refer the reader to Harary et al., 1975 and Diersel, 1997 for a deep discussion on directed graphs.9
2.3.  A Description of the Recent Evolution of the Network
From 1991 to 2000, the size of the R&D network in pharmaceuticals has increased
substantially. Table 1 shows the number of collaborations, by partners’ type, for the
first ( a) and the second ( b) half of the Nineties. As it is evident, non industrial
research institutes and new biotechnology firms have sustained the growth of the
network acting as  Originators  of projects developed by large pharmaceutical
companies and leading biotech firms. Over time, the biotech-biotech network has
increased significantly, in correspondence with the raise of a set of agreements based
on the new general purpose research technologies.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 shows the number and the value of R&D collaborative agreements and
M&As during the Nineties. The number of organizations active in the R&D network
has stabilized around 500, more than twice as many as in 1991, while the number of
research alliances subscribed has grown fourfold, and the value of collaborations in
the period 1997-2000 was five times greater as compared to the beginning of the
nineties. At the same time, the number of M&A events has been steadily high,
culminating with a few mega-mergers in the last years
5.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The sustained growth of the network in the last decade reflects the opening up of new
technological opportunities driven by the evolution of relevant scientific and
technological knowledge bases, especially through advances in the fields of
genomics, proteomics, molecular diversity, and high throughput screening. As shown
in Figure 2, the proportion of collaborations devoted to general purpose technologies
took off starting from the early Nineties, up to about 35% of the total in 1997-2000.
The new technologies have bolstered the expansion of the network, somehow blurring
the distinction between Originators and Developers. In fact, in the second half of the
1990s, organizations have increasingly tended to play both roles (see Figure 3) and,
as we have noticed, the number of collaborations among biotech firms has increased
significantly (see Table 1 above).
                                                
5 1996: Ciba-Geigy – Sandoz (Novartis); 1997: Roche – Boehringer Mannheim; 1998: Hoechst Marion
Roussel – Rhône-Poulenc Rorer (Aventis); Sanofi – Syntélabo; Astra – Zeneca (AstraZeneca); 1999:10
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In a nutshell, the evolution of the network during the Nineties can be synthesized as
follows. First, the size and connectivity of the network has increased significantly
over time. Second, non industrial research institutes and biotech firms have continued
to originate new technological opportunities. Third, large pharmaceutical companies
have played a pivotal role in structuring the division of innovative labor within the
industry, acting as Developers of R&D projects started by a set of smaller specialized
Originators. Fourth, the new Originators which have entered the industry based on
General Purpose Research Technologies have tended to establish new links
irrespectively of their partners’ age (and connectivity).
3 Relational Regimes and the Growth of the Network
In this section, we analyze the topological properties of the network and characterize,
in a preliminary way, the generative processes underlying its growth in the last
decade. In particular, we show how the combination of the cumulative and the
random relational regimes sketched above has increased the frequency of new
interconnections among firms and fields of activities, inducing dramatic changes in
the global structure of the network.
In order to come to a better understanding of how different combinations of actors
and relational roles have shaped the growth and the structure of the network, we have
performed a decomposition procedure (Dulmage-Mendelsohn (DM) Procedure: see
Dulmage and Mendelsohn, 1967), sorting the nodes of the network in different
classes based on their relational properties.
The DM decomposition procedure isolates a set of vertex covering separators of
minimum size, i.e. the smallest set of firms able to reach out to every network
components which, if removed, would dissect the overall graph into the highest
number of isolated subgraphs. In the DM decomposition the vertex set V of a graph N
is partitioned into two sets O and D, in such a way that no two vertices from the same
                                                                                                                                           
Pharmacia & Upjohn – Monsanto (Pharmacia Corp.); 2000: Glaxo Wellcome – SmithKline Beecham
(Glaxo SmithKline); Warner Lambert – Pfizer.11
set are related (see Asratian et al., 1998). In the case of the network under
investigation, the two vertex sets correspond to  Originators and  Developers,
respectively
6. A matching of N is defined as a set of edges (and hence a subset of E),
no two of which are incident on a common vertex (see Lovasz, Plummer, 1986;
Diersel, 1997)
7. An example is reported in Figure 4. The graph in Figure 4 (a) has two
color classes – black and white vertices – corresponding to its bipartition. The bold
lines represent a possible matching of the bipartite graph. A vertex covering of a
graph N is defined as the subset of vertices C ˝ V, such that each edge e is incident to
some vertex in C. The lines that belong to a matching are said to be admissible, while
the remaining ones are called inadmissible
8.
Figure 4 synthesizes the logic (a) and the outcomes (b) of the Dulmage-Mendelsohn
Decomposition, in graph (a) and matrix (b) terms. The graph presented in Figure 4 (a)
refers to a stylized network, while the matrix of Figure 4 (b) provides a representation
of the network as for the year 2000.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 4,  OM denotes  matched Originators, while,  OU identifies  unmatched
Originators. Moreover, O(D) means that there is a matching alternating path from d
to  o, for some  o˛O 
9. The same notation holds for  Developers. As a result, the
following components are singled out:
(1)  O1 ” OM(DU)  D1 ” DU ¨ DM(DU) ;
(2)  O2 ” OMM D2 ” DMM ;
(3)  O3 ” OU ¨ OM(OU)  D3 ” DM(OU) ;
Firms classified either in O1 or in D3 cannot be assigned an unambiguous relational
role within the network, i.e.  they play a transversal role, attracting most of the
                                                
6 The reader might find it helpful to recall the adjacency matrix representation discussed in section 2.2.
In those terms, the two vertex sets are associated with rows and columns respectively. For further
details on this point see Orsenigo, Pammolli and Riccaboni (2001).
7 A matching of maximum cardinality is a maximum matching. If it covers all vertices is called perfect.
8 Incidentally, is useful to notice that an edge e is inadmissible if and only if there exists a minimum
vertex cove r — i.e., a cover consisting of as few elements as possible — such that e belongs to that
cover (see Lovasz, Plummer, 1986; Asratian et al., 1998).
9 A path is alternating relative to a matching if its edges are alternately in the set of matched and
unmatched edges.12
agreements at any given point in time (they are present in all the intersections among
minimum coverage vertex sets).
In the case of the network in pharmaceuticals, the leading Developers have tended to
establish multiple relationships with a wide variety of Originators. As for
Originators, a clear distinction can be drawn between a set of firms that are co-
specialized in their relational behavior, i.e. they are matched, and a set of firms that
play a transversal role within the network.
Through the comparison of the output of the procedure at different points in time we
are able to show that a variety of generative processes and corresponding
relationships has characterized the evolution of the graph.
In particular, during the period of observation, a dramatic increase of the overall
degree of interdependence within the network can be detected. Figure 4 (b) shows the
results of the Canonical Decomposition performed on the set of collaborative
agreements signed in the year 2000. As it is evident, the region (O1,D3) of the matrix,
which contains relationships that are transversal within the network, is highly
populated, while it was almost empty at the beginning of the Nineties.
An analysis on the identity and the technological background of the nodes classified
as O1 has revealed that relational roles within the network correspond to organizations
embodying different types of technologies (see also Orsenigo, Pammolli, and
Riccaboni, 2001). Our controls have shown that Originators specialized in general
purpose research technologies belong with high probability to  O1  and play a
transversal role within the network. Almost all the firms which are active in general
purpose research technologies (i.e. genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and
molecular diversity), turned out to be transversal Originators in the graph at different
points in time. Conversely, and most important, all the organizations classified as O1
by means of the DM permutation of the matrix act as Originators of general purpose
research technologies. Finally, all the most connected Developers have been located
by the algorithm in D3, as they have been able to integrate, through collaborative
agreements, the new general purpose technologies with more “conventional” research
opportunities and techniques, originated by firms acting as Co-specialized technology
suppliers.13
This last result is confirmed, in a synthetic way, by the evidences produced in Figure
5, in which we plot the probability of having a new agreement (probability of
relinking) for different categories of firms classified according to the technological
content of their previous agreements. As it is evident, the probability of relinking is
highest for firms that are able to act integrating both Co-specialized and General
Purpose Technologies. Interestingly enough, different generative processes seem to
be in place for Originators vs. Developers, as confirmed by available empirical
evidences on the existence of measurable differences in their connectivity
distributions (see Riccaboni, 2000; Riccaboni and Pammolli, 2001).
[INSERT FIGURE 5ABOUT HERE]
4     Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how specific technological and relational regimes have
shaped the growth of the R&D network in pharmaceuticals during the Nineties.
First, our analysis has revealed the existence of a differentiated set of regimes of firm
growth within the network, so providing additional evidence supporting prediction
that both growth and innovative activities of large and small firms respond, even
within a given industry, to considerably different technological and economic factors
(see Winter, 1984; Acs and Audretsch, 1988).
Second, we have shown, in the context of a specific industry and by means of a series
of preliminary and explorative empirical analyses, that information on the topological
properties of a given industrial settings and on roles/positions of organizations within
it can be used to disentangle some fundamental generative processes underlying
observed processes of growth. This result is interesting, since it constitutes an
important contribution to the ‘old’ stochastic approach to firm growth (see Ijiri and
Simon, 1977; Sutton, 1997), in the direction of building parsimonious and, at the
same time, more realistic, representations of processes of industrial growth
(Riccaboni, 2000; Riccaboni and Pammolli, 2001).
In conclusion, we want to state that the graphical toolkit we have introduced is an
useful complement to more traditional econometric and analytical techniques to
capture the essence of industrial dynamics when systems are far from stable and
unambiguous equilibrium configurations. We expect that such an apparatus can
deserve insightful applications in future research, whenever regime shifts and14
technological change are important issues in explaining the growth of firms and
industries.15
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Table 1. Number of Collaborations, by Partners’ Types. First (a) and Second (b) Half
of the Nineties
(a) 
Developers  1991-1995 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  Total 
(1) Lead Pharma  73  47  20  75  16  231 
(2) Pharma  82  63  15  65  11  236 
(3) 1 Tier Biotech  74  27  15  40  4  160 
(4) Biotech  279  135  58  87  39  598 




















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Number (a) and Value (b) of Mergers and Acquisitions (full lines) and











































Figure 2. Proportion of alliances based on general purpose technologies (genomics,










                                                
10 See Friedman, 1984.20
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Developers
Originators/Developers
OriginatorsFigure 4.  Classification of the Nodes of a Graph According to the Dulmage-Mendelsohn Decomposition Procedure (a); Dulmage-Mendelsohn





















DM(OU)Figure 5. Complementarities Among Relational Roles in the Evolution of the
Network